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Positivism has had a tremendous impact on the development of the social sciences
over the past two centuries. It has deeply influenced method and theory, and has
seeped deeply into our broader understandings of the nature of the social sciences.
Postmodernism has attempted to loosen the grip of positivism on our thinking, and while
it has not been without its successes, postmodernism has worked more to deconstruct
positivism than to construct something new in its place. Psychologists today perennially
wrestle to find and retain their intellectual balance within the methodological, theoretical,
and epistemological struggles between positivism and postmodernism. In the process,
pre-postmodern criticisms of positivism have been largely forgotten. Although they
remain deeply buried at the core of psychology, these early alternatives to positivism
are rarely given explicit hearing today. The current piece explores some of the early
critiques of positivism, particularly of its scientism, as well as early suggestions
to tip the scales (back) in favor of sapientia (“wisdom”). This third option, largely
overlooked within mainstream psychology, is of tremendous value today as it is both
deconstructive and constructive relative to the shortcomings of positivism. It avoids the
overly reductionistic “trivial order” of positivism, as well as the deeply unsatisfying and
disorienting “barbaric vagueness” of postmodernism, while simultaneously embracing
important core elements of both currents of thought.
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INTRODUCTION
Psychological science is – for pragmatic considerations – mostly oriented toward positivism, which is
perceived as a modern but not postmodern epistemology. Postmodern psychology has not yet arrived
in mainstream psychology. [. . .] How can psychology move on from modern toward a postmodern
science, and is this really necessary or useful? (Frontiers in Psychology, n.d.)
These lines from the call for papers are helpful for framing the arguments made in the text
below as they point to several important characteristics of contemporary psychology. It has been
long-clear that, while as a methodology positivism is powerful, as a philosophy for the social
sciences it is deeply problematic (Sheen, 1934/2019). By taking the limits of method to be the
limits of knowledge, we have artificially narrowed our understanding of knowledge. By way
of the processes of conceptualization and operationalization that grant it its power, positivistic
epistemology artificially limits the person (in its Menschenbild) to the empirical and measurable,
and disregards or even denies all else. Positivism in psychology has been linked with our “almost
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neurotic need to be seen as scientific” and “to reject the subjective
world” (Baker, 1992, p.13). The attempt to more thoroughly
describe or define positivism has been called a task taken
up by the “presumptuous and masochistic” (Caldwell, 1994,
p.1), a tongue and cheek expression of a sentiment found
in several classic explorations of positivism, such as that by
Mill (1865/2005) and Kołakowski (1968). Kołakowski (1968)
argues that all such attempts are at least partially arbitrary, but
that this arbitrariness is unavoidable if we are to meaningfully
work with the term at all. Such an approach recognizes that
within the history of positivism, “repetitions can take deceptively
different forms” (Tolman, 1992, p.8). Thus, following the lead
of such earlier scholarship, we will use a broad, inclusive
understanding of positivism, a school of thought generally
involving phenomenalism and the rejection of metaphysics,
nominalism anchored in (usually quantifiable) empirical data,
claims to value-free objectivity, and claims that science can be
thought of as a (largely singular) enterprise that develops over
time and that represents not a way of knowing the world but
as the way of doing so (Kołakowski, 1968). The exact nature of
this “temper of mind” or “style of thinking, which as a rule is
not dealt with by its adherents” (Kołakowski, 1968, p.vi), can
be “better known through the enemies of that mode of thinking
than through its friends” (Mill, 1865/2005, p.1). Thus, we stand
to gain a better appreciation of positivism by examining one of
its opponents, postmodernism.
Postmodernism can be broadly understood as an attempt
to reemphasis precisely those elements of our lives that
tend to be marginalized or overlooked within positivistic
epistemology (Hicks, 2011). Nevertheless, despite the best efforts
of postmodern thinkers to tear down positivism, despite the
label of positivism being disavowed by most and even seen
as “perverse” by many psychologists today (Smythe, 1992),
and despite increasingly evident epistemological and practical
shortcomings of positivistic epistemologies (e.g., as seen in the
“replication crisis” in psychology), positivism remains on center
stage in mainstream psychology, teetering between being a
philosophy and a methodology (Huniche and Sørensen, 2019).
While the label of positivism is rarely explicitly used today, and
even less so as a form of self-identification, exploring its influence
on current psychology is in no way to “kick a dead horse,” as the
expression goes, precisely because the “horse is far from dead.
Positivist thinking is too powerful, even today, to go away by
itself ” (Tolman, 1992, p.7). Steinmetz (2005) colorfully expressed
the continued presence of positivism within various disciplines
of the human sciences, including psychology, as follows: “Despite
repeated attempts by social theorists and researchers to drive a
stake through the heart of the vampire, the disciplines continue
to experience a positivistic haunting” (p.3; see also Tolman, 1992;
Laudan, 1996). Thus, regardless of who we see as the hero of the
story (a pertinent question itself these days given the popular love
of vampire stories), we seem to be at an impasse.
Rather than focusing on the points of conflict between
positivism and postmodernism, in the current piece it is argued
that we should take a step back so as to examine earlier, pre-
postmodern objections to positivism and that in doing so we may
identify a path or paths out of the apparent stalemate; paths that
include core elements of both positivism and postmodernism.
Thus, the arguments presented below are not new. They are, in
fact, quite old. It will be argued that the way forward is based
on old questions and old insights, and thus, this piece is what
we might call a reminiscence. The answer to the problems of
positivism lies not in a greater embrace of postmodernism, but
in a more thorough examination of our older intellectual, if not
academic, roots that are critical of positivistic philosophy. Rather
than addressing the shortcomings of positivistic epistemology
(i.e., method-turned-philosophy) by means of postmodernism,
the field would be better served by deeper, more consequential
reflections on sapientia, a form of metaphysical wisdom “that has
seemed to grow so weak in the modern era, as homo sapiens has
waned and homo sciens has waxed” (Aeschliman, 1983, p.20). To
borrow the language of Whitehead (cited in Aeschliman, 1983,
p.69), this classic third option avoids the overly reductionistic
“trivial order” of positivism, whereby meaningfulness is sacrificed
for mathematical precision, as well as the deeply unsatisfying and
disorienting “barbaric vagueness” of postmodernism, whereby
meaningfulness is lost in a world of subjectivity and relativity. At
the same time, sapientia nevertheless embraces important core
elements of both currents of thought.
We begin by examining the rise of materialistic philosophies in
the 17th and 18th century, which led to the spread of positivism
in the 19th century. In these periods, science was in the process
of breaking away from other avenues of knowledge (e.g., the
arts, theology), even though many scientists themselves remained
deeply committed to them (Harrison, 2015). As materiality and
quantification increasingly replaced spirit and quality as the
means of validity, method came to constitute a philosophy in
itself (Sheen, 1934/2019). Over time, the belief in the value of
scientific methodology became scientism, the belief in science not
only as a philosophical school of thought but as the philosophical
school of thought. We then briefly explore how attempts to
free the social sciences from the reductionism of positivistic
philosophy took the form of postmodernism. While asserting
the greater complexities of our lived experiences than can be
seen based on positivism alone, postmodernism is primarily a
deconstructive, reactive process, unable to truly free us from
positivistic reductionism. Postmodernism has highlighted the
shortcomings of scientism, and fought tooth and nail against
it, but it is unable to move us forward on its own two feet.
It is for this reason, as reflected in the call for papers, that
psychology remains largely wedded to a modern epistemology
that is simply deeply unsatisfying; we have developed an
epistemological Stockholm syndrome, whereby we claim to be
fleeing from a philosophy we simultaneously actively profess.
Finally, we examine a handful of pre-postmodern positions
based on sapientia that have been buried under the weight of
our predominantly positivistic worldview. These positions can
be reemphasized in a psychology that asserts the wholeness of
the human, including the material and quantifiable, but also
those parts beyond the conceptual reach of the scientific method
(Mazur and Watzlawik, 2016; Mazur, 2017). This third path
asserts the power of science as method, while also critically and
cautiously supporting the polyvalence and complexities of life
highlighted in postmodern thought. By reasserting the primacy
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of metaphysics over methods, sapientia promotes the power of
science without overextending it into philosophy, and it thereby
encourages the kind of fundamental, agentic judgment and
discrimination that can allow us to benefit from the insights of
postmodernism without fear of being consumed by its “barbaric
vagueness.”
THE EPISTEMIC IMPERIALISM OF
SCIENCE AND THE RISE OF SCIENTISM
“The epistemic imperialism of science” is a phrase used by
Harrison (2015, p.190) to describe how science has come to be
the dominant arbiter of what counts as genuine knowledge in
the modern West. The empire of science was built over the last
three centuries, but the true reach of its empirical aspirations only
became clear relatively recently. Despite how recent science is in
its modern form, it has been argued that earlier schools of thought
constitute forerunners of the notion of science-as-philosophy.
For example, pelagianism, the assertion that humans can reach
a state of perfection by their own means without the help of God,
has been pointed to as an early forerunner of positivism (Sheen,
1934/2019). Within psychology itself, the work of Ferdinand
Ueberwasser (1752–1812) has been pointed to as a positivist
project predating Wundt’s famous laboratory by roughly a
century (Schwarz and Pfister, 2016). Such earlier intellectual roots
aside, what we now perceive to be a fundamental and eternal
conflict between scientific and metaphysical epistemologies
(including “faith-based” epistemologies) is a relatively recent
development, and it would have been completely foreign to
most people, including practitioners of empirical science, in the
17th, 18th, and even into the 19th centuries (Hunter, 2000;
Harrison, 2015). An important element in the development of
this modern epistemic rift is the emergence of the modern notion
of objectivity, whereby validity is thought to be determined on
the basis of quantification and tool-based mediation between
the subject-as-researcher and the object of inquiry (Daston and
Galison, 2007; Huniche and Sørensen, 2019), claims that also
variously appeared in psychology (Danziger, 1990; Baker, 1992).
By means of our objectifying tools, we have increasingly broken
up the world into smaller and smaller parts (Gozli and Deng,
2018), a process that has been accompanied by an increased
fragmentation of academic and intellectual disciplines (Cornejo,
2017). Huxley (1937, p.276) wrote that “intensive specialization
tends to reduce each branch of science to a condition almost
approaching meaninglessness” and that there “are many men
of science who are actually proud of this state of things.
Specialized meaninglessness has come to be regarded, in certain
circles, as a kind of hall-mark of true science.” While the social
sciences, including psychology, are often thought of as latecomers
to this process, social scientists in fact played an important
role in the transformation of scientific methodology into a
scientific philosophy (i.e., scientism), as seen in the development
of influential social theory (e.g., Auguste Comte) and even
the development of formal methods of quantification and
statistical testing (e.g., Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, and Charles
Spearman; Bury, 1920; Sheen, 1934/2019; Scriven, 1966). Over
time, science came to be increasingly thought of as fundamentally
separate and independent from other epistemologies (Daston
and Galison, 2007). Mainstream psychology came to primarily
conduct method-driven research (Danziger, 1990; Huniche and
Sørensen, 2019). Steinmetz (2005) has argued that not only does
psychology have a close relationship with positivism but also
some subfields such as social psychology are openly hostile to
non-positivistic approaches. The degree to which positivism has
been absorbed into psychology, he argues, makes it difficult to
identify subfields that are truly free from it: “Even to locate
a frontier between positivism and non-positivism in the fields
concerned with the psychic, then, we are best advised to move
beyond psychology into psychoanalysis” (p.12). Interestingly, this
“frontier” implies that even within Freud’s psychoanalysis, there
is a considerable degree of positivism (Elliot, 2005). What is more,
most (but certainly not all) criticisms of psychoanalysis are based
on various forms of positivism. For example, while Karl Popper
may have been a vocal critic of logical positivism, his argument
that psychoanalysis is essentially unfalsifiable is itself a positivistic
position, although he did not himself like that term (Steinmetz,
2005). Popper largely rejected an inductionistic approach to
science (1960); hence, his clash with the Vienna Circle and
with what is often thought of as classical positivism. Within
his hypothetico–deductive model of science, his deductivistic
realism even makes room for imagination, fantasy, metaphysics,
or guesswork as the starting point of scientific investigation.
However, for Popper, these positions are only tenable to the
extent that they be translated into empirically falsifiable scientific
theories (Maxwell, 2017); hence, his line of thinking, as well
as various other forms of hypothesis testing and probabilistic
claims within psychology can be thought of as falling into
the broad camp of positivism (and thus, he was attacked
as a positivist by the Frankfurter School). Similarly, Popper
believed intertheoretical translations to be of importance for the
development of science, as it was only in this way that a new
theory could be shown to be more falsifiable, but less falsified,
than its predecessors (Laudan, 1996). Popper’s positivism can be
seen all the more when contrasted with the thinking of Kuhn,
whose “relativism about standards is the exact counterpoint
of Popper’s methodological conventionalism” (Laudan, 1996,
p.16). Nevertheless, although we are making use of a broad,
inclusive, and rather simplistic understanding of positivism in
this short piece, it needs to be clearly acknowledged that,
like postmodernism, positivism is not a singular, homogenous
philosophy, but rather speaks to a very diverse set of positions
and practices (Kołakowski, 1968; Feichtigner et al., 2018). Mill’s
(1865/2005, p.1) 19th century observation on the use of this label
is further illustrative of this point: “more than one thinker who
never called himself or his opinions by those appellations, and
carefully guarded himself against being confounded with those
who did, finds himself, sometimes to his displeasure, though
generally by a tolerably correct instinct, classed with Positivists,
and assailed as a Positivist.”1
1This was expressed more recently by Kołakowski (1968, p.1) thus: “Not all,
however, who according to historians or critics profess the positivist doctrine,
would agree to be classified under this heading.”
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While a simplified version of positivistic science has come to
be thought of as a philosophy within our everyday understanding
of knowledge, most scientists acknowledge the metaphysical
nature of such a position. Thus, most scientists have come, at least
implicitly, to agree with Huxley’s assertion, despite the claims
of early positivists like Auguste Comte, that it “is impossible to
live without metaphysic” (1937, p.252). To say that we should
“let the data speak for themselves” contains the belief that these
data are important, that they have something to say, and that it is
worth hearing them out. However, most people’s understanding
of science and matters of methods or metaphysics tend to be on
precisely such a “bird’s eye” level, and the view of knowledge
as being based on value-free, “objective” science is widespread
(Aeschliman, 1983; Porter, 1996). “Decide on the basis of facts
alone” became a mantra in modern times, and it remains so for
many today, even among research psychologists. The continued
dominance of positivism within psychology (Steinmetz, 2005),
both as method and philosophy, shows that such thinking is
widespread among social scientists who are aware of postmodern
objections to positivistic epistemology. While various fields have
gone through a wave (or waves) of intense empirical materialism,
followed by periods of distancing from it, much of mainstream
psychology appears to remain largely trapped in what Max
Weber called the “iron cage of rationality,” whereby not only is
validity determined on the basis of quantification and empirical
measurement, manipulation, and control, but also all other forms
of knowledge are deemed secondary, if not irrelevant (Danziger,
1990; Valsiner, 2012). Put even more plainly and at the risk
of oversimplification—we remain impressed by numbers. The
bittersweet humor of the aphorism that “90% of statistics are
made up on the spot” speaks not to the problem of statistics
or quantification per se, but to the widespread, exaggerated, and
even problematic nature of their persuasive power (Porter, 1996).
MAD AS A HATTER: THE “MADNESS” OF
POSITIVISM AND OF POSTMODERN
RESPONSES
A flippant person has asked why we say, “As mad as a hatter.” A
more flippant person might answer that a hatter is mad because
he has to measure the human head. (Chesterton, 1908/2015, p.7)
Extreme positivism has indeed led to various forms of
“madness,” but so too has the postmodern response to it. This
is what led Laudan to call postmodern thinkers “the new crazies”
(1996, p.3, italics added), a phrase which suggests the madness of
both groups. As the general confusion sewn by postmodernism
is well-known and widely discussed (e.g., Sokol and Bricmont,
1998; Valsiner, 2009; Hicks, 2011; Scruton, 2019), we will devote
more time here to the madness of positivism. We will now briefly
examine an illustrative example of the madness that can arise
from the positivistic project.
Singer (2013), a moral philosopher and animal rights activist,
made a telling utilitarian argument on the basis of positivistic
methods turned positivistic philosophy for “effective altruism”
(elsewhere called “outcome-based funding”). Effective altruism
asserts that the quality of a charity can be determined on the
basis of the number of quantifiable outcome units that result from
each monetary unit invested in the given charity. Singer suggests
that since it costs on average 40,000 United States dollars to raise
and train a seeing-eye dog for a single blind American, but that
the same amount of money could pay for operations that would
allow between 400 and 2,000 people to regain their eyesight in the
developing world (e.g., to treat glaucoma or cataracts), we should
all redirect our donations from the first to the second kind of
charity. Once the utilitarian ground has been laid, Singer points to
the suffering, not of 2,000 sentient beings, but of literally billions
of animals on the planet due to meat production, deforestation,
and other forms of mistreatment. If we are counting, that number
is certainly impressive and indeed heartbreaking, so perhaps that
cause is an even better, more deserving recipient of our charitable
donations. Singer does not stop there. Just as one blind person
can be trumped by 2,000 blind people, and 2,000 blind people can
be trumped by billions of suffering animals, so too can billions
of suffering animals be trumped by the potential destruction
of the entire planet along with all the creatures, big and small,
living thereon. Thus, suggests Singer, perhaps we should be giving
our charitable donations to the development of technologies that
would shoot potentially Earth-ending asteroids out of the sky
(or rather, shoot them to smithereens before they get that close).
Rather than donating to afterschool programs for at-risk youth,
suicide prevention hotlines, or cultural centers for the elderly, the
quantification inherent in “effective altruism” would have us send
checks to the space program. Here, decisions are made on the
basis of mathematical calculation; responsibility lies in the tools,
rather than in our own hands.
Postmodernism is currently one of the main voices in
the social sciences that stands actively against the overly
restrictive Menschenbild of positivism (Hicks, 2011). Much like
the proliferation of new Protestant denominations after Catholic
authority had been challenged, the notion of postmodernism
can be thought of as an umbrella term that includes a large,
and seemingly ever larger, number of different schools of
thought (Steinmetz, 2005). Collectively, postmodernism is a set of
inherently “critical, strategic and rhetorical practices [. . .used. . .]
to destabilize other concepts such as presence, identity, historical
progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of meaning”
(Aylesworth, 2015). An attempt to define postmodernism,
or even to explore it to any satisfactory degree, is well
beyond the scope of the current piece. After all, “[t]hat
postmodernism is indefinable is a truism” (Aylesworth, 2015).
Postmodern thinkers have done much to shake the overly
restrictive foundations of positivism, often by means of the
intuitively unsatisfying nature of positivism, and they certainly
have captured the imagination of many a social scientist and
“layperson” alike (Sokol and Bricmont, 1998; Hicks, 2011;
Scruton, 2019). Postmodernism has time and again illustrated
how our lived experience in effect simply slips through the bars
of positivism’s methodological and epistemological iron cage.
It has defended a wider scope of epistemological validity than
that offered by positivistic reductionism alone (Steinmetz, 2005).
However, postmodernism’s primarily deconstructive nature
remains inherently wedded to positivism, as its negation. Thus,
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while postmodernism rightly challenges positivism’s expansion of
usefully reductionistic method into overly restrictive philosophy,
it has been unable to offer satisfying methodological or
philosophical alternatives (Sokol and Bricmont, 1998; Hicks,
2011; Scruton, 2019). “[P]ostpositivism is an intellectual failure.
The arguments on its behalf are dubious and question-begging.
Still worse, it has sustained virtually no positive program of
research” (Laudan, 1996 p.5). Within psychology, “the post-
modernism avalanche has been the replacement of inquiry by
an epistemological battlefield” (Valsiner, 2009, p.2). However, the
failure of postmodernism is not necessarily sui generis:
what proved to be the undoing of postpositivism was not its
departures from the positivist orthodoxy that preceded it. Rather,
what has doomed postpositivism to amount to little more than
a hiccup in the history of epistemology is the fact that it has
carried to their natural conclusion several tendencies indigenous
to positivism itself—tendencies that, once one sees their full
spelling out, turn out to be wholly self-defeating. (Laudan, 1996,
p.6)
Thus, postmodernism’s “barbaric vagueness” can itself be
understood as arising in large part from earlier attempts to
“measure the head” (Tolman, 1992). It is therefore to early
criticisms of positivism that we now turn to.
SAPIENTIA AS AN EARLY OBJECTION
TO POSITIVISM
Challenges to the kinds of materialistic reductionism and
quantification seen above are nothing new. For example, in
contrast to the rationality of the Enlightenment, the likes of
Vico and Herder asserted the fundamental importance of what
Theodor Lipps later called empathetic Einfühlung, whereby we
“feel into” the lives of qualitatively different others (Berlin, 1976).
Similarly, as soon as psychology and sociology appeared at the
university as independent disciplines at the turn of the 20th
century, social scientists struggled to assert the fledgling fields’
independence of philosophy on the basis of empirical research,
while being simultaneously aware of the very serious limitations
of reductionism (usually quantification and control), causal
explanation, and prediction (Bruner, 1990). Even the founder of
the first psychology laboratory in 1879, Wilhelm Wundt, became
concerned with the overly positivistic turn the field was taking
and thus attempted to promote a more historically oriented,
interpretive cultural psychology (Völkerpsychologie) as a form of
counterbalance (Bruner, 1990; Valsiner, 2012). Similar to Wundt,
Max Weber thought that our ability to predict human behavior
was improved by the social sciences, but that it was also limited.
He believed the best we could achieve in combining scientific
methods and human variability was “adequate causality,” an
approach that still very much describes the actual practices
of statistical analysis in the social sciences today, even if
hidden behind more strongly positivistic language (Tolman,
1992; Ringer, 2004). While he believed in the value of what
he called the “ethic of responsibility” (Verantwortungsethik),
whereby meaning is determined on the basis of causal relations
in the empirical world, he was equally convinced of the need
for the “ethic of conviction” (Gesinnungsethik) whereby the ends
of human action, in the form of non-quantifiable values and
meanings, must necessarily guide human life (Weber 1903–
06/1975, p.192). Thus, according to Weber, the “social sciences,
which are strictly empirical sciences, are the least fitted to
presume to save the individual the difficulty of making a choice”
(1949, p.19). Even the practicing scientist cannot escape living
in a world that extends beyond the reductionistic horizon of
positivism; “It can never be the task of an empirical science
to provide binding norms and ideals from which directions for
immediate practical activity can be derived” (Weber, 1949, p.52).
Perhaps the nearest we can get to expressing it is to say this: that
his mind [the follower of scientism] moves in a perfect but narrow
circle. A small circle is quite as infinite as a large circle; but, though
it is quite as infinite, it is not so large. (Chesterton, 1908/2015, p.8)
This short quotation wonderfully captures both the
tremendously broad, and simultaneously limited, scope of
positivism. The power of the scientific method for better
understanding and manipulating the material world is
undeniable. At the same time, in describing positivistic science
as infinite but nevertheless “not so large” as sapientia, Chesterton
uses the language of quantification to poetically evoke that which
cannot be quantified, that which lies beyond even the infinite
reach of science.
In the modern world, it has become increasingly difficult to
speak about wisdom because we have indeed become trapped
in what Max Weber called the “iron cage” of rationality. We
have come to expect small, bit-sized slices of information to
satisfy our search for knowledge, and to save us the difficulty of
making discriminating judgments (Scruton, 2007). This can be
clearly seen in the example of Singer’s utilitarian assessment of
charitable donations. Broadly speaking, this is a truly daunting
problem. How can we consciously and conscientiously reflect on
the strengths and weaknesses of positivistic epistemology when
that has become the dominant epistemological language we have
come to speak? Wittgenstein (1953) expressed something similar
when he wrote: “The existence of the experimental method makes
us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble
us; though problem and method pass one another by” (p.232).
So as to break free of such positivistic language, advocates of
sapientia have generally spoken in images or pictures rather
than facts or data, in terms of qualities rather than quantities,
in the language of poetry rather than prose, with the aid of
judgment-provoking questions rather than unequivocal answers.
In opposing the rigidity of positivism, thinkers such as G. K.
Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and L. Wittgenstein, generally wrote
in a fantastical, poetic style, and often even in the language of
fantasy or poetry themselves. To be clear, these thinkers were
not against science, in the form of positivism-as-method. In fact,
quite the opposite was generally the case. However, they were
against scientism; the worship of a powerful method that, by
default and design, constructively impoverishes our view of life
and our Menschenbild.
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This is the paradox of imagination in science, that it has for its aim
the impoverishment of imagination. By that outrageous phrase, I
mean that the highest flight of scientific imagination is to weed
out the proliferation of new ideas. In science, the grand view is a
miserly view, and a rich model of the universe is one which is as
poor as possible in hypotheses. (Bronowski, 1964, p.46)
The power of this impoverishment has been historically
connected to Hume’s separation of “is” from “ought,” that
is, the separation of inductive observations from normative
positions (Brinkman, 2019). This is precisely the split that
Weber and others (e.g., Popper) both acknowledged and found
problematic. While some have argued the division between
“matters of fact” and “matters of concern” to be largely artificial
(Knorr-Cetina, 1991; Latour, 2004), both the power and pull
of the scientific method is all but undeniable, and it echoes
even in postmodernism (i.e., as its rebuttal). From the point
of view of sapientia, it is not that scientific reductionism,
causal explanations, or attempts at prediction are problematic
in themselves. In fact, they are powerful and incredibly useful
tools. Rather, the problem is that they have come to constrict
our field of vision, leaving us with a myopic focus on the tools
before us rather than a broader view of the wider world. Just as
one should not forget the house for the hammer and the nails,
one should not confuse the house with a home. In the words of
C. K. Lewis, “second things suffer when put first” (in Aeschliman,
1983, p.33). This is similar to what Ortega y Gasset, 1948/1968,
p.19) called the dehumanizing effect of “inhuman inversion” and
what Polanyi (1958) called “moral inversion.” If we understand
science as a tool—not the only tool at our disposal, although a
very important one—for the study of our lives and our world, we
will be able to once again (re)focus on the important questions,
rather than the questionnaires, that are driving our investigations.
Given our strong attachment to positivism in psychology, we
may find ourselves still wondering at this point what exactly
sapientia is, which is to say that we want a clear, positivistic
definition. While we can confidently assert that the search for
wisdom is roughly as old as humankind and that this search is
found across cultures (Speer, 2005; Staudinger and Glück, 2011),
singular definitions are inherently unsatisfying. Attempts to
unilaterally define the notion belies the pull of positivism and the
processes of increasing rationalization (Weber, 1949; Harrison,
2015). Some have even argued that “wisdom is the prototype
of the class of psychological phenomena that by definition are
unapproachable and unexplainable through scientific analysis”
and that “to make wisdom transparent and to transform it
into a subject matter of public knowledge and scientific debate
is bound to change its basic foundation” (Baltes and Smith,
1990, p.89). This challenge aside, there have been considerable
efforts by psychologists to conceptualize and operationalize
wisdom so as to turn it into a measurable variable for empirical
study (for overviews see Baltes and Smith, 2008; Staudinger
and Glück, 2011; Ferrari and Weststrate, 2012; Bangen et al.,
2013). These efforts are certainly laudable and have yielded
valuable insights into the nature of our psychological lives.
Nevertheless, to assume that this line of empirical research can
capture the richness of wisdom is to misunderstand the issue
at hand (Midgley, 1989; Maxwell, 2007). This is an example
of Bronowski’s “impoverishment of imagination” whereby we
meaningfully and usefully make sense out of an otherwise
essentially overwhelming phenomenon, forgetting in the process
how much is necessarily lost in translation. While this approach
can be valuable, it is also precisely what allows postmodernism to
meaningfully object; in this case arguing that wisdom has been
too narrowly and rigidly defined. However, in moving away from
the ostensible clarity of empirically grounded conceptualizations
and operationalizations, postmodernism turns quickly into a
form of “anything goes” that renders the concept subjective to
the point of meaninglessness. While positivism pushes figures
and facts to the point of fault, postmodernism does so with
the world of subjective feelings. By contrast, and at the risk
of oversimplification, the approach of sapientia stresses neither
figures nor feelings, but the elevating aspect of fantasy. It does
not attempt to definitively solve the challenges before us (as
do the positivists), nor does it attempt in essence to deny the
existence of those challenges (as do the postmodernists). Rather,
it recognizes the perennial relevance of the questions. Within
clinical psychology, for example, while positivistic approaches
would attempt to identify answers to questions of mental health,
and postmodern approaches would illustrate the relative and
subjective nature of both the questions and the answers, sapientia
would remind us of the importance of reflecting again and again
on the questions, e.g., what is mental health?
Thus, sapientia escapes clear, fixed definition. Like the haiku,
it breaks free of representation, be it in numbers, words,
linearity, circularity, and sequentiality, etc., while simultaneously
avoiding the “anything goes” aspect of postmodernism. This
understanding of sapientia is metaphorically explained by G. K.
Chesterton (1908/2015 p.14) as follows: “The one created thing
which we cannot look at is the one thing in the light of which we
look at everything. Like the sun at noonday, mysticism explains
everything else by the blaze of its own victorious invisibility.”
[. . .] “But the circle of the moon is as clear and unmistakable, as
recurrent and inevitable, as the circle of Euclid on a blackboard.
For the moon is utterly reasonable; and the moon is the mother
of lunatics and has given to them all her name.” Below we briefly
review a few examples of how sapientia can reassert itself when
we draw our attention back from a scientistic attachment to
method, or what Gordon Allport called “methodolatry” (cited in
Bruner, 1990, p.xi).
The Reinstatement of the Individual
The more science-as-method became science-as-philosophy, the
less relevant became the individual to our overall intellectual
pursuit in psychology. The reductionistic materialism of
positivism has tended to reduce the attention paid to the
individual by placing an increased focus on the aggregate.
Danziger (1990) referred to this as the “triumph of the aggregate.”
Measures of central tendency are highlighted and outliers ignored
or removed. This can allow us to see general principles beyond
individual data points, and it is from this that science generally
gains its power. While ideographic research has had a long and
ongoing influence on the development of the sciences, including
psychology, it is generally only considered to constitute scientific
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knowledge once it has been extended beyond the individual
(Salvatore and Valsiner, 2010). Numerous breakthroughs in
psychology occurred in precisely this manner (e.g., memory
research with patient “H.M.”), as has been the case in other fields
as well (e.g., studying individual planets or other cosmic bodies
that are not easily replicable).
The strength of this epistemology-of-the-aggregate is also
reflected in postmodernism in at least two interesting ways.
On the one hand, as a reaction to positivism, postmodernism
explicitly attempts to negate the epistemological certainty it
affords. Thus, aggregate-level data are largely rejected, and
the lion’s share of attention within postmodern psychology
is received by the individual case, especially the explicitly
idiosyncratic case that cannot be readily linked into a larger
collective or calculated into averages (such cases can, of
course, also be on the group level, for example, by focusing
on a particular collective). However, lest postmodernism fall
into epistemic certainty on the individual level, following the
exploration of a particular case, one often sees assertions of
wider polyvalence, whereby the singular voice in question is
but one among many such voices. In the words of Ernest E.
Boesch, “a broom is a broom is a broom,” by which he meant
there are many different ways of seeing even a single, simple
object (cited in Straub and Weidemann, 2007). On the other
hand, despite such attempts to reject the modern epistemology-
of-the-aggregate, postmodernism often sneaks such positivistic
thinking in by the back door. For example, even when
acknowledging the researcher’s necessarily subjective position,
postmodern psychology attempts to retain some sense of
(“scientific”) objectivity. This often takes the form of tool- or
method-based distancing from the object of study, as such
distance is understood—in line with the positivistic notion of
objectivity (Porter, 1996; Daston and Galison, 2007)—to assure
the validity of their truth claims about those same objects. For
example, such notions as reaching the saturation point across
interviews or setting a concrete number of interview subjects
“required” to reach validity now seen in many journals, are
in fact doing epistemology-of-the-aggregate without numbers
(Holzkamp, 2013; Sousa, 2014; Huniche and Sørensen, 2019).
Such methods are in effect different versions of letting the “data
speaking for themselves”; the conclusions are being drawn from
the objects of study via presumably “neutral” tools, and they are
assumed to not be coming directly from the researcher, while
they remain in many cases deeply method drive (Huniche and
Sørensen, 2019). Thus, the ostensible openness and judgment-
free position of the postmodern researcher, similar to the
tool-based or method-based mediation of the natural sciences
and positivistic psychology, distance the researcher from their
research object, suggest the data to speak for themselves, and
allow for claims of objectivity. This is psychology’s version of what
Whitehead (1920) called the bifurcation of nature, whereby the
observer’s tools allow them to objectively observe the observed.
Thus, postmodernism tends to involve the explicit denial of the
epistemology-of-the-aggregate, while simultaneously implicitly
retaining it, although in a more subtle form.
Advocates of sapientia are not necessarily concerned with
aggregate data, but by what Passmore (1978) called the
“de-anthropomorphization” of human beings that can arise
when the aggregate is valued above the individual. Historian
Arnold Toynbee (1972/2015) was concerned by the “fanatical
worship of collective human power,” something that C. K. Lewis
referred to as “that hideous strength” (Aeschliman, 1983, p.27).
Incidentally, it is not surprising that psychology’s maturity as a
scientific and academic discipline at the start of the 20th century
was marked by its close association with eugenics, perhaps the
paradigmatic example of valuing the collective over the individual
(Yakushko, 2019). A foreshadowing of this can be heard a century
earlier in Comte’s lament regarding “the perennial Western
malady, the revolt of the individual against the species” (cited
in Hayek, 1944/2007, p.70). Advocates of sapientia thus share
postmodernism’s assertion of the individual in abstraction from
the collective, the promotion of the individual data point apart
from the aggregate, in advocating for the outlier rather than the
mean. However, sapientia differs from postmodernism by virtue
of its simultaneous embrace of science as method, including
the aggregate-level insights that come with it. What is more,
sapientia asserts the value of the individual and the subjective as
metaphysical values, a claim that postmodernism, in its general
eschewal of epistemological certainty, would tend to avoid.
The Notion of Progress
Positivism is not only committed to the “infinite but narrow”
circle of various forms of reductionism, but it is also deeply
wedded to the notion of linear, unidirectional progress (Bury,
1920; Löwith, 1949). Positivists, including many psychologists
today, believe (either explicitly or implicitly) that science marches
progressively forward, and that with each new step we are
that much closer to building a better, and perhaps even more
perfect, world. The evolution of this particular understanding of
linear, material progress arose over millennia, from the cyclical
understanding of history of the Greeks and Romans to the
Christian understanding of history that grafted otherworldliness
(i.e., of salvation in the afterlife) onto Judaic historical linearity
(Löwith, 1949). Positivism arose from this linear understanding
of history, but rejects the notion of otherworldly hope, placing its
telos in the material world. The hope of positivism lies in material
progress and the (often implicit) belief in the perfectibility of the
world. Within modern positivistic thinking, this understanding
of progress has been further supported by numerous processes
of conceptual reframing, such as the tendency to retrospectively
(re)define “successes” (i.e., past positions that are supported
today) as part of science, and “failures” (i.e., previously held
positions that are rejected today) as unscientific (Sismondo,
1996). In this way, science appears to be always moving forward
and on the right path.
While art history is certainly a serious academic discipline, few
historians of art would argue that art has advanced in a linear
manner over the centuries, and even fewer would profess a faith
in the eternal, progressive march forward of the arts. Beauty has
not gotten more beautiful, nor has our understanding of beauty
been progressively improving. However, many scholars working
in the natural sciences, such as chemistry or physics, would make
what are at heart largely positivistic arguments regarding the
evolution of their fields (even though these arguments would
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be more nuanced today than pure, classic positivism). The
scientism and methodolatry of psychology encourage a similar
understanding of the field as progressing in a linear fashion.
Empirical research in psychology, in the form of “neat little
studies” (Bruner, 1990, p.xi) is expected to explicitly build,
step-by-step, toward an ever-better understanding of human
psychological processes. By default, and all things being equal,
that which we know today is thought to be better than that which
we knew yesterday, but inherently, an impoverishment of what
we will know tomorrow.
With its focus on empirical research within “neat little studies”
and on the “publish-or-parish” model of career development (and
survival), contemporary psychology has witnessed an exponential
growth of data collection. Within psychology, the rate of data
collection has far outpaced the development of theory (Valsiner,
2014), reminding us of Percy Williams Bridgman’s statement
regarding mathematics: “As at present constructed, mathematics
reminds one of the loquacious and not always coherent orator,
who was said to be able to set his mouth going and go off and
leave it” (cited in Sheen, 1934/2019, p.69). In addition to the
numerous practical reasons for this development, one of the
additional factors implicitly underlying it and implicitly justifying
it is the positivistic belief in the forward march of progress
on the basis of empirical data. The more data, the better. We
have come to assume that the accumulation of facts equals the
accumulation of knowledge. However, “Facts as facts do not make
scientific knowledge” – “Experiments may abound, but there is no
necessary increase in knowledge” (Sheen, 1934/2019, pp.60–61).
To the extent that postmodernism undercuts epistemic
certainty, the notion of unilinear progress is an impossibility. In
the face of multiple truths, not only is forward motion impossible
to identify, but so too is a singular, “correct” path along which
we may travel. Postmodernism therefore rejects the utopianism
of positivism, and its understanding of polysemy often even
challenges singular claims to progress. Like postmodernism,
sapientia is not wedded to such a unidirectional notion of
progress as is positivism. Within sapientia, the choices of today
are not understood to be necessarily better than the ones
of yesterday, and there is no necessary link between wisdom
gained and the development of a better world. By seeing
method as method, and not philosophy, sapientia promotes
reflection on questions that are long-lasting if not eternal, even as
particular puzzles about the material world might be solved. For
example, even as we unravel many a mystery regarding particular
issues of mental health (e.g., treating syphilitic dementia with
penicillin), the question of what mental health is remains.
Science is uniquely powerful for solving particular puzzles
related to the material world, but it does not answer the
fundamental questions of life. By shifting the telos back from
the material world to broader metaphysical questions, claims
of unilinear progress and utopian visions of tomorrow become
more difficult to sustain. By the same logic, sapientia would
not automatically subscribe to the assumed value of increasing
empirical data collection within more and more “neat little
studies.” However, unlike postmodernism, sapientia asserts the
value of the larger questions, not because they can be unilaterally
answered as asserted by the positivist, but because they give
life a simultaneously perennial and variable directionality that
is generally undercut in postmodernism. This point will become
clearer when we examine contradictions below.
Contradictions
The positivistic understanding of progress generally implies a
rejection of contradictions. If two scientific claims contradict
each other, something is amiss. Of course, in practice, scientists
can come to contradictory conclusions for any number of
reasons, and in fact, such tension lies at the heart of the scientific
enterprise itself. Nevertheless, the power of science comes from
its ability to make distinctions between competing theories and
to explain or otherwise reconcile differences in the data. This is
arguably broadly similar to the galvanizing and creative role of
conflict seen in more specific schools of thought, such as conflict
theory or Hegelian dualism, whereby social progress is made not
on the basis of contradictions or conflicts themselves, by in the
form of some sort of resolution (which is incidentally a nice
example of how the postmodern search for conflict is deeply
rooted to the positivistic search for resolution, Laudan, 1996).
Within clinical and developmental psychology, this often appears
in the form of various “crises,” which lead to psychological growth
(for an exploration of the “either-or” choice between objectivism
and subjectivism in psychology, see Mos and Boodt, 1992).
That the need to resolve contradictions lies at the heart of
the positivistic enterprise can be clearly seen in mainstream,
quantitative psychology when experiments produce inconsistent
or even contradictory findings. Researchers often work very hard,
if not to definitively resolve them, then to explain them away by
the addition of yet more variables; thereby kicking the proverbial
can further down the road. An example of this can be seen in
mainstream psychological research on power. Embedded within
a larger positivistic research paradigm (including reductionistic
conceptualizations and operationalizations, assumptions of
variable control, the separation of variables, claims of causality,
and replicability, etc.), high levels of power have been reported to
make people lazy information processors, relying on previously
held heuristics, and less flexible in the face of new information;
however, other studies have found high levels of power to
make people efficient information processors, relying less on
previously held heuristic rules, and being more flexible in the
face of new information (Guinote, 2015; Mazur, 2015). Such
contradictory findings led to the formulation of the situated
theory of power (Guinote, 2010), whereby variable, and even
contradictory, information processing strategies are possible at
high levels of power. . . depending on other variables (e.g.,
differences in motivation, goals, and situational factors). In
light of such “variable buttressing,” whereby new independent
variables are added to hold up the presumed causal effects
of other variables, it is not surprising that the main concept
of interest itself slips further and further away. From variable
buttressing emerge such claims as the following: “It may be less
useful to seek a unified definition of power than to focus on
systematic mapping of how the effects of power covary with the
kind of power studied; that is, perhaps we are always consigned
to study just one limited aspect of power at a time, but we
can do so deliberately and explicitly, using multiple perspectives
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and approaches in programmatic research” (Overbeck, 2010,
p.32). Here we see a “three cup trick” at work, whereby the
addition of yet more variables distracts us from the main point of
interest; the definition of the construct (here “power”) vanishes,
while these definitional problems somehow do not exist for
subcategories of the construct (here “various kinds of power”)
precisely because they lead to measurably different outcomes.
Thus, within such positivistic research programs, the definitional
nature of key concepts becomes their functions within larger
causal chains (Mazur, 2015). This belief in the progressive value
of adding rules to further explain previous rules, which were
themselves expansions of previous rules, has been called the
“additive fallacy” (Mazur, 2015). Interestingly, this process of
smoothing out contradictions can be linked back to the drive for,
and assumed value of, increased data collection and the linear
progression of knowledge discussed earlier.
Postmodernism rejects this additive approach to knowledge
and objects to this smoothing out of the rough edges of our
lives in the name of singular explanations. Being reactionary
in nature (i.e., “against” positivism), postmodernism actually
highlights and promotes precisely such rough edges. In other
words, postmodern thought is not so much an assertion of
particular contradictions, but of contradiction itself. Within
postmodernism, the contradiction is understood to be a tool
to destabilize essentialized identities, the notion of historical
progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of meaning.
The postmodern voice is an “oppositional voice, a cry against
the actual on behalf of the unknowable” (Scruton, 2019, p.15).
Phenomenon and method are merged, and truth becomes
indistinguishable from discourse. Sticking with the example
of power, being “coextensive with the social body” (Foucault,
1980, p.142), power is understood in postmodernism as fluid
and undefinable, but also ubiquitous. Opposition to power is
inherently opposition to the social, particularly social stability,
whatever that might mean in the given time and place.
Positivism is an attempt to remove contradictions, and
postmodernism works to counteract those efforts. Sapientia,
on the other hand, recognizes the insights gained by scientific
discrimination (i.e., judging competing theories on the basis of
data), while it also celebrates the contradictions of life—and it
does so for their constructive, rather than deconstructive, value.
In this tradition, contradictions, much like scientific tools, can be
of epistemic value. Stated in the reverse, advocates of sapientia
object to the reconciliation or resolution of contradictions seen
in positivism (an objection shared with postmodernists), but they
also object to the “contradiction-as-epistemic-uncertainty” found
in postmodernism. Sapientia sees contradictions as a source of
knowledge, as a way to break from the reductionistic rigidity of
positivism. This particular celebration of contradictions has been
called “bi-polar extremism” (Barron, 2004) within the Christian
tradition, but it also finds expression in other religious, cultural,
and historical contexts, such as the second century Mahayana
Buddhist texts of Nāgārjuna (Garfield, 1995). The bipolar
extremism of sapientia also finds expression in psychology, such
as in Jungian archetypes (e.g., where each person contains light
and shadow, male and female) or more recently in the notion of
catalyzation within cultural psychology (Valsiner, 2014). Within
sapientia, contradictions constitute paradoxes that inspire, not
puzzles to be solved (as for the positivist) or perennial negations
of truth at which we might throw up our hands in resignation
or despair (as in postmodernism). The lover of sapientia “always
cared more for truth than consistency. If he saw two truths that
seemed to contradict each other, he would take the two truths
and the contradiction along with them. His spiritual sight is
stereoscopic, like his physical sight: he sees two different pictures
at once and yet sees all the better for that” (Chesterton, 1908/2015,
p.14). To stick with the metaphor of images, we can say that while
positivism attempts to resolve the multistability of contradictions
so that one truth wins out, and while postmodernism oscillates
back and forth between the two ad nauseam, sapientia allows
us to see both images at once (for a discussion of multistability
see Mazur, 2019). With regard to power, perennial reflections
on the nature of power lie at the heart of sapientia, and
the questions that emerge are neither answered definitively
away (as in positivism) nor deemed essentially subjective and
unanswerable (as in postmodernism).
Wonder at the Ordinary
Our tendency to be enamored by positivistic reductionism,
including quantification, has in effect distracted our attention
from the actual object(s) of interest. This point can be seen in
the quantification of psychological phenomena. Gustaw Ichheiser
expressed this general challenge of positivistic psychology
as follows: “the higher the adequacy of a psychological
description, the stronger, paradoxically, the inevitable impression
that ‘nothing new’ was really presented” (1943, p.207). The
overquantification of psychological phenomena seen in modern
psychology can cause a form of amnesia whereby we forget what
we were interested in the first place:
the psychologist may possess the knowledge about certain
psychologically relevant facts as long as he is not acting in
his capacity as a “psychologist.” But, paradoxically enough, he
forgets, ignores, or neglects those facts as soon as he transforms
himself into a psychological expert and in this role performs some
scientific research. (Ichheiser, 1943, p.206)
To be clear, the point is not that quantification cannot bring
with it important insights regarding the nature of our world and
our lives, including psychological phenomena. In fact, sapientia
would not necessarily oppose the use of any tools at our disposal
to better understand our lives. What is more, science—even
strongly positivistic aspects of science—can certainly inspire
wonder. This wonder cannot only inspire scientists in their
work, but also it can often lead them to understand science
to be, in fact, the ultimate source of wonder. Writing in the
areas of physiology and psychology, Emil (Harleß, 1851, pp.20–
21) captures this sentiment beautifully when he argues how the
wonder of the natural world can remain hidden from what
he calls “the unarmed eye” (das unbewaffnete Auge; without
scientific tools like the microscope): “We are amazed by the
beauty and the regularity with which the delicate plant cells
are aligned with each other—and we trample with indifference
the leaves of grass that are built out of them.” However, the
wonder such investigation can cause lies not in the numbers or
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the methods or even the objects of investigation themselves, but
in us (Polanyi, 1958; Wagoner et al., 2017). An awareness of the
humanity of wonder is reflected in the stereotyped presentations
of strictly positivistic minds in popular culture, such as Sherlock
Holmes or the characters Mr. Spock and Data from Star Trek,
characters whose excessively analytical minds are marked by a
reduction in human emotion, including the sense of wonder.
By way of contrast, Holmes’ sidekick Dr. Watson is himself
a scientist, but he is also deeply human, and he records the
adventures of Sherlock Holmes precisely because of his sense of
wonder at this uniquely overly analytical man. A similar contrast
to the character of Spock is seen in the passionate character
of Captain Kirk.
“And so we see that the poetry fades out of the problem
and by the time the serious application of exact science begins
we are left only with pointer readings” (Eddington, 1928/2012,
p.252). It should not surprise us that the “pointer readings” of
psychological research do not perfectly match the reality of our
psychological lives. In fact, it should come as a great relief. As a
response to positivism, sapientia not only redirects our attention
to the ordinary, but reawakens our wonder at it. The ordinary
not only constitutes the basic building blocks of our lives, but
it is what makes our lives fantastic. As G. K. Chesterton put
it, things that are common, like death or first love, are not
necessarily commonplace; “Ordinary things are more valuable
than extraordinary things; nay, they are more extraordinary”
(1908/2015, p.26). Various schools of thought have emerged in
psychology that constitute attempts to reinvigorate the study
of those very topics that have been in decline during the
ascent of positivistic thinking (i.e., various versions of “cultural
psychology,” not to be confused with cross-cultural psychology;
Bruner, 1990; Lonner and Hayes, 2007; Valsiner, 2014). While
such schools of thought generally lie outside the mainstream
of psychology, they address issues that lie at the heart of the
field, such as the study of mind rather than just the brain, the
study of creativity rather than just causality, and the study of
historically and socially based processes rather than presumed
universality. These smaller branches of psychology thus share
this fundamental similarity with early objections to positivism
on the basis of sapientia; by redirecting our attention away from
positivistic methods, they attempt to reawaken our wonder at
that which has come to be seen as “ordinary” or that is made
“normal” based on statistical normality. Here again, we hear
echoes of postmodernism’s objection to claims of normality
(Scruton, 2019). However, unlike in postmodernism where the
relativism of polyvalence curtails the depth and reach of wonder
(as but one possible view), sapientia allows us to retain the object
of wonder, precisely as an object of wonder.
DISCUSSION
Writing over a century ago, Georg Simmel argued that our
increasing reliance on calculability and rationality (e.g., within
the money-based economy) was having a significant impact
on human psychology and social relations more broadly. This
arose from:
the growing preponderance of the category of quantity over that
of quality, or more precisely the tendency to dissolve quality into
quantity, to remove the elements more and more from quality,
to grant them only specific forms of motion and to interpret
everything that is specifically, individually, and qualitatively
determined as the more or less, the bigger or smaller, the wider or
narrower, the more or less frequent of those colorless elements and
awarenesses that are only accessible to numerical determination.
(Simmel, 1978/2004, p.278)
For the likes of Simmel and Weber, the problem was not so
much with quantification itself, but with its imperial tendencies.
Our reliance on calculability and rationality was changing the way
we think and act. Something similar has happened in the field of
psychology. Quantification has not only come to dominate as a
methodological tool, but it has come to color our thinking about
psychological phenomena more broadly. Despite the best efforts
of postmodern thinkers, mainstream psychology retains a largely
modern, positivistic epistemology.
Rather than rejecting the tools afforded us by positivistic
thought, sapientia challenges us to recognize them as just that,
tools. They are limited and necessarily unable to grasp the
entirety of our psychological lives. Positivism is powerful as
method; however, it is problematic as philosophy. To return to
a metaphor used earlier, positivistic epistemology can help us
identify the tools and the methods of their use by which we
may build a more solid house, but it cannot make it a home
nor even help us to better understand what that might require.
In other words, positivism cannot fully capture the psychosocial
meaning-making processes that should constitute the core focus
of psychology (Bruner, 1990). In the words of Gustaw Ichheiser:
We should not expect and demand that everything should be
“proved.” To say it once more, social scientists should, in my
opinion, not aspire to be as “scientific” and “exact” as physicists
or mathematicians, but should cheerfully accept the fact that what
they are doing belongs to the twilight zone between science and
literature. (cited in Rudmin et al., 1987, p.171, italics added)
It has been argued that we can indeed cheerfully accept this
state of affairs, and that in doing so, we will be able to once
again see aspects of our psychosocial lives that have become
obscured by the dominant positivistic epistemology, such as the
importance of the individual and of subjective experience, the
notion of personal progress in a complex world, the epistemic
power of contradictions, and a childlike wonder at our world.
Positivistic epistemology in psychology is certainly powerful, but
it is also of limited use; however, the way to approach those
shortcomings lies not in postmodernism. Rather, we should
more fully recognize that as psychologists, we “are still drawing
rich sustenance from our more distant, pre-positivist past”
(Bruner, 1990, p.x).
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